



---

Mariehamn, Åland, 24-26 August 2025

## **Conference Resolution**

Adopted by the 34th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC)

Mariehamn, Åland Islands, 26 August 2025

---

The participants, elected representatives from the

Parliament of Denmark  
Parliament of Estonia  
Parliament of Finland  
Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany  
Parliament of Iceland  
Parliament of Latvia  
Parliament of Lithuania  
Parliament of Norway  
Parliament of Poland  
Parliament of Sweden  
Parliament of Åland  
Parliament of the Hanseatic City of Bremen  
Parliament of Faroe Islands  
Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg  
Parliament of Greenland  
Parliament of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  
Parliament of Schleswig-Holstein  
Baltic Assembly  
European Parliament  
Nordic Council,

assembling in Mariehamn, Åland Islands, on 26 August 2025

- express strong and unconditional support for the people of Greenland and their inalienable right to decide over their own country and future, a fundamental and inviolable principle of international law;
- acknowledge the intensifying geopolitical, ecological, and socio-economic challenges in the Baltic Sea Region, requiring renewed commitment to multilateral cooperation, democratic resilience, and sustainable development;
- welcome the 2025 CBSS Ministerial Declaration adopted in Vihula, Estonia; <https://cbss.org/ministerialdeclaration2025> as well as the 2025 VASAB Ministerial Tallinn Declaration on Spatial Resilience ([https://vasab.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/VASAB\\_Ministerial\\_Tallinn\\_Declaration\\_on\\_Spatial\\_Resilience.pdf](https://vasab.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/VASAB_Ministerial_Tallinn_Declaration_on_Spatial_Resilience.pdf));
- underlining the shared priorities of democratic cohesion, societal resilience, and strengthened regional security in line with the objectives of the BSPC;
- reaffirm their steadfast commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine;
- support the efforts of Ukraine to become a member of the EU;
- express their deep concern over recent hybrid attacks and acts of sabotage against underwater infrastructure, the intensification of shadow fleet operations, and the growing risk posed by outdated and uninsured commercial ships operating in the Baltic Sea;

- recognise the progress made in intergovernmental coordination, including the meetings of NATO Heads of State and Government in Helsinki (14 January 2025), the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea (16 May 2025), the Joint Declaration concerning Baltic Sea Security (5 June 2025) and the NATO Summit in The Hague (24–26 June 2025);
- underline, in light of the progress achieved through the Helsinki Summit on 14 January 2025 and its follow-up initiatives, the validity of the BSPC's repeated calls for an institutionalised summit-level dialogue among the democratic Heads of Government of the Baltic Sea Region;
- recall, in view of this year's evolving geopolitical developments, that democracy, the rule of law, ecological sustainability and human rights constitute fundamental and non-negotiable core values of the BSPC;
- reiterate the need to protect vulnerable groups: protect the rights and ensure the safety of refugees, ethnic minorities, LGBTQ people, women, children, the elderly and other vulnerable groups who are particularly at risk in times of war and threatened by intolerant attitudes, and defend sexual and reproductive autonomy and respect the right to reproductive health;
- emphasise the critical importance of effective diplomacy, also between parliaments, as a cornerstone of stability, conflict prevention, and sustainable cooperation;
- emphasise with utmost clarity that international cooperation – including among partners within a shared framework of collective defence – must be based on the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic governance, and full respect for international law;
- emphasise the fundamental importance of cooperation between democratic institutions, the private sector and civil society in safeguarding freedom, stability, and prosperity in the Baltic Sea Region;
- note with interest the ambitions of the recently presented EU Ocean Pact and the focus to coordinate and enhance implementation of all ocean-related policies to improve the protection and restoration of ocean health;
- welcome, in particular, the Ocean Pact's specific and urgent priority to address the poor status of the Baltic Sea, to hold a high-level event, and to strengthen the cooperation with existing regional bodies such as HELCOM;
- recognise that the decline of Baltic Sea fish stocks is a threat to the ecosystem, coastal communities' livelihoods, and all Baltic Sea countries' food security and food sovereignty;
- commend the strong involvement of youth voices, exemplified by the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) as well as other youth institutions actively engaged across the Baltic Sea Region;
- support, uphold and strengthen Baltic Sea Region cultural and educational ties, co-operation and projects as foundations of our identity and cornerstones of our common values;

**call on the Governments in the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS, and the EU**

**Regarding Geopolitical Challenges – Safeguarding Democracy and Stability in the Baltic Sea Region to**

- 1. Reaffirm their unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity** and maintain a unified stance against Russia's continued aggression, occupation, and violations of international law, including in the Baltic maritime domain.
- 2. Increase collective deterrence and preparedness** against hybrid threats, including sabotage of critical maritime infrastructure, cyberattacks, and information manipulation, by improving threat analysis, institutional resilience, and joint rapid response capacities.
- 3. Underline the importance of actively pursuing peaceful solutions** and upholding non-military measures for security in the Baltic Sea region — such as diplomacy, international law, and cooperative regimes — even amid increasing military investments and strategic defence efforts.
- 4. Ensure that increased defence and security cooperation**, as required by the geopolitical situation, is carried out with full respect for international legal regimes, such as the demilitarisation and neutralisation of the Åland Islands.
- 5. Strengthen coordination between national security strategies and democratic safeguards**, ensuring that responses to emerging security threats fully respect the rule of law, fundamental rights, and parliamentary oversight while reaffirming the importance of free and independent media, transparent electoral processes, and effective counter-disinformation measures as well as encouraging continued efforts to further enhance these essential pillars of democratic resilience across the Baltic Sea Region. Enhance the involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens' initiatives, and democratic watchdogs in monitoring, early warning, and public communication mechanisms related to hybrid threats, cyber disinformation, and crisis management as building trust and public legitimacy in crisis responses, echoing the EESC Opinion SOC/812's call for structured cooperation between public institutions and NGOs. Intensify efforts across the Baltic Sea Region to counter disinformation, promote digital literacy and secure free and pluralistic media. The BSPC supports the development of a European Democracy Shield and encourages joint initiatives between national parliaments, media actors, and civil society to increase societal resilience against hybrid threats.
- 6. Expand cooperation with NATO and the EU** to ensure sustained protection of undersea infrastructure, maritime supply routes and vulnerable offshore installations, including pipelines, cables, and wind farms; support and reinforce existing NATO maritime security operations, such as Operation Baltic Sentry and Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic).
- 7. Deepen integration of European security policy** and defence industry to ensure the efficient use of resources. Support NATO's ongoing efforts to strengthen maritime security in the Baltic Sea, including enhanced operations against the shadow fleet, the development of real-time hybrid threat response capabilities, and the establishment of permanent maritime monitoring through joint NATO–EU deployments.

- 8. Promote the institutionalisation of a long-term NATO maritime security mission in the Baltic Sea**, building on current operational frameworks to create a permanent regional presence to deter hybrid and conventional threats.
- 9. Ensure structured parliamentary participation in regional security architecture**, including in relevant NATO and EU forums on maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, and cyber defence; support the active involvement of the BSPC in this dialogue.
- 10. Strengthen CBSS and EU engagement in resilience-building**, including through enhanced political and financial support for projects under the European Defense Fund (EDF), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, as well as through multi-level cooperation and the contribution of various organizations, including, among others, the ongoing work of ministers responsible for spatial planning and development with VASAB (Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea) to improve territorial resilience in the Baltic Sea region; jointly advocating for adequate EU funding for these programmes and supporting community-led initiatives, local social infrastructure, and the active participation of civil society in relevant projects under the EDF, CEF, and PESCO.
- 11. Strengthen the implementation of international maritime law** in light of emerging threats to ensure faster and more coordinated responses to future incidents affecting the Baltic Sea, including through closer cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
- 12. Contribute to the alignment of national and EU maritime law and its implementation** with the evolving threat landscape, ensuring consistent definitions of sabotage, criminal accountability for infrastructure attacks, and coordinated prosecution frameworks.
- 13. Ensure accountability for shadow fleet operations** and expand sanctions mechanisms targeting insurers, flag states pursuing unlawful activities, and logistical operators enabling unlawful and environmentally hazardous Russian tanker traffic; consider the creation of Baltic Sea prohibited zones for uninsured tankers and vessels violating sanctions regimes.

## **Regarding Energy and Environmental Resilience and Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea Region to**

- 14. Ensure the well-being of all citizens in the Baltic Sea Region** through coordinated action and shared commitment to human security, including civil preparedness for climate-related emergencies and hybrid threats, including risk communication, participatory climate planning, and civil society engagement in preparedness strategies. Take collective leadership in preparing society for the consequences of a potential +4 °C global temperature rise by 2100, by mandating climate risk assessments in all public investments, stress-testing critical infrastructure, enhancing local adaptive capacities, and scaling up best-practice solutions to protect ecosystems, food systems, and public health across the region. And foster community-based adaptation and resilience networks, especially in rural, coastal, and marginalised areas, ensuring bottom-up contributions to climate security and social preparedness.
- 15. Coordinated and swift implementation of existing concepts such as EUMSS:** Fully implement existing concepts such as the EU's Maritime Security Strategy, before developing new frameworks, in order to promote resilience and

counter threats in the Baltic Sea Region, and elaborate a comprehensive strategy in the form of well-coordinated, detailed, region-wide framework to enhance the resilience of energy supplies, transport and communications networks. This strategy must integrate threat-specific resilience planning and align with both national initiatives and existing EU/NATO frameworks for protecting critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region, and it must integrate lessons learned from Ukraine's experience in energy and critical infrastructure protection under wartime conditions. Call on the governments in the democratic Baltic Sea region to ensure the development of a draft version of such a regional strategy by March 2026.

**16. Strengthening maritime domain awareness, surveillance capabilities and legal frameworks in the Baltic Sea and centralising responsibilities across the Baltic Sea region:**

**Central coordination and surveillance mechanisms**

Promote a centralised coordination mechanism within the Baltic Sea Region to address maritime threats proactively. This mechanism should focus on early detection, rapid response, and the prevention of criminal activities, drawing on existing cross-national cooperation frameworks and aiming for alignment with NATO initiatives. Support and advocate the timely implementation of the Baltic Sea CUI Hub as a central means to strengthen maritime domain awareness and surveillance, ensuring close cooperation with existing civilian and military structures.

**Advanced maritime surveillance technologies**

Promote the creation of a cooperative framework for the joint use and development of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (drones) and other advanced maritime surveillance technologies. Modelled on initiatives such as those being tested in Denmark, this approach should enhance persistent and resource-efficient situational awareness and the protection of critical infrastructure, with coordination of operations and data analysis conducted also by civilian authorities or existing civilian-led maritime centres. Develop and apply automated monitoring systems, including satellite surveillance, AI-powered anomaly detection, and sonar-based detection of underwater activities, and integrate these where appropriate into cooperative frameworks for advanced maritime surveillance technologies.

**Data-sharing and CISE integration**

Advocate for real-time data-sharing agreements between Baltic Sea states, encourage actions pursuing collaborative maritime security which are fully aligned with NATO regional plans, coast guards, and infrastructure operators; expand the implementation of CISE to all relevant partners in the Baltic Sea basin; and establish a continuous, secure data-flow between maritime authorities in the region.

**Legal harmonisation and accountability**

Harmonise existing legal frameworks among democratic Baltic Sea states – in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU) – to criminalise intentional disruptions to critical subsea infrastructure, ensuring sanctions and legal accountability, and promote their common, standardised and legally compliant interpretation and implementation. Ensure that attacks on critical infrastructure are effectively prosecuted and avoid duplication of structures and legal norms. Develop a joint operational protocol for responding to sabotage and hybrid attacks, including coordination between military, law enforcement, and emergency response actors.

**Rapid response mechanism**

Call for the establishment of a Baltic Sea Rapid Response Mechanism (BSRRM) to ensure that joint naval and coast guard teams can react to suspected sabotage within hours.

**Digital resilience and open-source infrastructure**

With regard to digital real-time connectivity, jointly fund and sustain open-source technology by launching a funding initiative focused on securing and advancing open-source digital infrastructure essential to the Baltic Sea region's connectivity and resilience. This could include setting up a regional fund to sustain and protect shared digital tools critical to maintaining cybersecurity and information integrity. Call on governments in the democratic Baltic Sea region to ensure the preparation of a detailed proposal for the establishment of this fund by March 2026.

**17. Coordinated Action Against the Russian and other Shadow Fleets:** Ensure that states and the private sector, irrespective of their nationality, that support and contribute to unlawful and environmentally hazardous shadow fleet operations aimed at circumventing sanctions, are held into account. Expand EU sanctions to include flag states, logistics providers, insurers, and other operators facilitating shadow fleet operations. Enforce port inspections and tracking of Russian-linked tankers to ensure full transparency of cargo and destinations. Establish criteria for coastal state enforcement measures against tankers that are deemed to represent acute threats to maritime safety or the marine environment. Develop a joint Baltic Sea-wide approach within the EU, IMO and other institutions, to clarify and develop the legal regime that applies to shipping operations and other major safety risks associated with the shadow fleet, such as distortion of GPS, AIS and other signals of critical importance for the safety of navigation in the exclusive economic zones in the Baltic Sea and beyond.

**18. Resilience and Redundancy of Energy and Communication Networks:** The Governments in the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS, and the EU must undertake the following actions to enhance resilience and redundancy in energy and communication networks, with implementation to commence immediately and target significant progress by 2030: Establish a Baltic Sea Critical Infrastructure Resilience Fund, co-financed by the EU and regional governments, to upgrade energy and communication networks; jointly propose the creation of a suitable EU co-financing mechanism. Invest in strengthening fibre-optic and power grid interconnections between democratic Baltic Sea states. Strengthen cyber resilience and intrusion detection systems for all undersea infrastructure.

**19. Strengthening NATO and EU Coordination on Baltic Sea Security:**

- Support and reinforce NATO's existing maritime security operations in the Baltic Sea, including enhanced Vigilance Baltic Sentry, coordinated by the German Navy's Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic) Headquarters in Rostock.
- Advocate for the institutionalisation of a long-term NATO maritime security mission in the Baltic Sea.
- Enhance EU-NATO cooperation by integrating NATO maritime security efforts with:
  - The EU's PESCO projects on maritime security,
  - EMSA's initiatives on surveillance and hybrid threats,
  - The EU's Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and European Defence Fund (EDF).
- Expand joint NATO-EU exercises focused on protecting offshore wind farms, pipelines, undersea cables, and critical coastal infrastructure, ensuring

integration of hybrid threat scenarios. Strengthen political and parliamentary engagement, including BSPC participation.

**20. Research in the field of sustainability, energy and transport innovation:**

Continue support for research in long-term energy solutions and innovative maritime mobility as well as in international law and security policy, ensuring proper financing and making EU funding accessible for all democratic Baltic Sea States including the possibility of joint applications and encourage the formation of research consortia of Baltic Sea Region actors to jointly participate in relevant EU funding calls.

**21. Establishment of Regional Repair Capabilities for Critical Maritime Infrastructure:**

Rapid implementation of the measures set out in the EU Action Plan on Cable Security ("Joint Communication on strengthening the safety and resilience of submarine cables"). Develop a coordinated Baltic Sea mechanism to repair damaged undersea infrastructure rapidly. Provide shared storage of essential spare parts and tools, and deploy multipurpose repair vessels. Ensure joint contingency protocols and shared technical standards for cross-border interventions. Support information exchange and cooperation, with particular emphasis on diplomatic activities in relation to third countries, in order to highlight the non-European dimension of this problem.

**22. Creation of a Baltic Sea Infrastructure Resilience Forum for Cross-Sectoral Exchange:**

Establish a standing Baltic Sea Infrastructure Resilience Forum to bring together public authorities, private operators, research institutions, and civil protection actors. Facilitate best-practice exchange on infrastructure climate and ecological resilience and emergency risk management across sectors. Include regular simulation-based training for resilience to hybrid and climate-induced disruptions.

**23. Development of a Baltic Sea Cyber Crisis Simulation Framework:**

Establish a recurring, multinational cyber crisis simulation framework focused on critical maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea Region. Engage public institutions (defence, energy, coast guard) and private stakeholders (grid operators, maritime companies). Utilise digital twins and scenario planning tools to create joint standard operating procedures.

**24. Promote structured cooperation**

between private offshore actors—such as energy companies—and national defence authorities to safeguard critical infrastructure and regional security; where needed, develop legislation to facilitate and regulate such collaboration in light of emerging threats in the Baltic Sea.

**25. Promotion of Multi-Use Design Standards for Critical Infrastructure:**

Introduce democratic Baltic Sea States-wide technical guidelines and planning incentives for the multi-use design of infrastructure assets. Promote cross-functionality of infrastructure (e.g., fibre-optic + power cables, transport + data corridors).

Incentivise public-private innovation projects on dual-purpose infrastructure.

**26. Enhancing Digital Resilience in Rural and Peripheral Areas of the Baltic Sea Region:**

Launch dedicated EU and national programmes to upgrade digital infrastructure in rural and island regions. Expand secure satellite and underwater connectivity (e.g. LoRaWAN, redundant cabling, 5G/6G backbones). Promote transnational connectivity resilience. Support the development of inclusive infrastructure initiatives to guarantee, for example, that public transport, broadband access, and smart mobility solutions reach marginalised people, low-income communities and rural areas.

**27. Integration of Environmental Risk into Maritime Security Strategy:**

Mandate environmental risk assessments (e.g. dredging impact, noise), including risks from oil spills, hazardous chemicals, and other noxious substances as an integral part of Baltic Sea maritime security planning. Incorporate environmental risk indicators into hybrid threat monitoring. Promote the development of dual-use detection technologies for both environmental and security incidents.

**Regarding Energy Security, Sustainability, and Youth Participation in the Baltic Sea Region (BSPYF)**

**28. Strengthening Prevention and Preparedness in Civil Protection:** Promote closer networking regarding conflict and disaster situations to enhance resilience, such as during pandemics like COVID-19. Support the exchange of civil protection forces, for example, healthcare professionals, to ensure a rapid and unbureaucratic response in emergencies. Expand pharmaceutical industries to ensure independence and availability of essential medical resources.

**29. Strengthening energy infrastructure through modernisation and partnerships:**

- Enhance the security and resilience of energy infrastructure by investing in the research and modernisation of outdated systems.
- Cooperate with the private sector and regional strategic partners, while complementing existing NATO initiatives.
- Advocate conditional energy subsidies alongside dedicated national energy-efficiency programmes to alleviate energy poverty and reduce household energy costs.

**30. Mapping vulnerabilities and advancing rapid response to maritime risks:**

- Strengthen the resilience of maritime critical infrastructure by identifying the most vulnerable areas through comprehensive mapping.
- Conduct joint risk assessments, coordinated training, and real-time information exchange between public and private sectors for rapid and effective threat response.

**31. Advancing the phase-out of fossil fuels and modernising regional energy systems:**

- Accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuels in regional energy consumption, within the framework of existing EU policies on moving away from fossil fuels (e.g. Fit for 55, RED III), prioritising the phase-out of non-European sources, first and foremost from the Russian Federation.
- Invest in sustainable energy solutions and modernise the regional power grid with smarter storage and distribution.

**32. Ensuring a just energy transition that leaves no one behind:**

- Lower energy prices, strengthen trust in public institutions, and support fragile communities.
- Provide targeted support and reskilling opportunities for those at risk of job loss due to the green transition.
- Insist that the transition to a low-carbon economy be guided by climate justice — ensuring vulnerable households receive support and no community is left behind in the green transition.

**33. Promote youth participation in energy:** Integrate youth perspectives in regional energy policy by establishing National Youth Advisory Bodies under the

Ministries of Energy (or equivalent). Ensure these bodies receive influence and cross-parliamentary recognition throughout the Baltic Sea Region.

- 34. Empower young people through green education and sector engagement:** Promote access to green education and foster opportunities for youth in the energy sector. Encourage exchange programmes, life-long learning initiatives, internships and mentorship schemes in the clean energy industry. Encourage the development of targeted programmes to support mental health services, and create job opportunities in emerging industries for young people in a non-discriminatory manner.

### **Regarding a Sustainable Baltic Sea – Marine Ecosystems, Fisheries, Climate, and Green Shipping to**

- 35. Strengthen the implementation of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan,** particularly in the fields of eutrophication mitigation, marine biodiversity restoration, and pollution control, and ensure alignment with EU and regional environmental legislation.
- 36. Urgently develop a recovery plan** for the Baltic Sea fish stocks where biomass is outside of safe biological limits to safeguard ecosystem functionality and food security.
- 37. Strive to designate bottom trawl-free zones in the Baltic** to protect vulnerable benthic ecosystems and enable long-term restoration of marine biodiversity, wherever this is justified by conservation objectives set for these ecosystems.
- 38. Ensure that the precautionary principle governs** all targeted fishing for fishmeal production, prioritising ecosystem resilience and food system sustainability.
- 39. Systematically integrate climate adaptation and biodiversity preservation** into maritime spatial planning, fisheries management, and coastal development strategies.
- 40. Reinforce the scientific foundations and governance capacities** of marine ecosystem monitoring, including through full support to HELCOM's updated indicator systems and assessment cycles.
- 41. Advance coordinated nutrient reduction policies** and promote sustainable agricultural practices that enable climate-resilient food systems while reducing runoff into the Baltic Sea.
- 42. Ensure the preservation of the environment** and nature if undertaking seabed mining.
- 43. Support the establishment and digitalisation of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs),** including improved connectivity and ecosystem-based management; increase transboundary cooperation to protect migratory species and shared habitats.
- 44. Promote the integration of marine digital twins** for real-time decision-making and long-term ecosystem forecasting, as recommended in the 2025 CBSS Baseline Report on Marine Digital Twins and Green Corridors, which should

take place within the framework of existing EU initiatives such as Horizon Europe, Copernicus and EU Mission: Ocean.

- 45. Expand investment and cooperation on Green Shipping Corridors**, particularly along core Baltic trade routes; ensure regulatory clarity, public-private collaboration and technological neutrality in corridor development.
- 46. Promote a modal shift to sea and rail transport** by directing investment towards intermodal infrastructure in underdeveloped parts of the Baltic Sea region. Strengthen clean ferry-based freight through targeted economic incentives, ensuring coherence with EU climate and transport policy frameworks.
- 47. Champion digital innovation in the Baltic Sea region** by positioning it as a global testbed for smart port ecosystems. Promote the development and deployment of digital twins and advanced data systems to enhance efficiency, reduce emissions, and strengthen resilience. Encourage cross-border data sharing and collaborative innovation initiatives to accelerate the digital transition in maritime infrastructure.
- 48. Enhance port infrastructure and connectivity**, including investments in shore-side electricity, smart logistics, circular economy practices, and hinterland transport links.
- 49. Recognise and mitigate environmental risks associated with shadow fleet activity**, mandate environmental risk assessments as part of maritime security and hybrid threat monitoring.
- 50. Support environmentally safe and timely clearance of sea-dumped munitions**, including through EU Horizon Europe funds, with special attention to ecological integrity, marine safety, and transboundary coordination.
- 51. Ensure alignment between HELCOM, EU and IMO regulatory frameworks**, avoiding regulatory fragmentation while enabling flexible, region-specific implementation pathways.
- 52. Support youth participation in marine policy** and sustainability education; expand civic science initiatives and biodiversity literacy in schools, in line with BSPYF recommendations.

## **Regarding a Coherent and Secure Bioeconomy in the Baltic Sea Region to**

- 53. Ensure coherence between bioeconomy, circular economy, biodiversity preservation and climate policy** by embedding national and regional bioeconomy strategies in integrated policy frameworks that align environmental protection, food security, energy transition, and industrial transformation.
- 54. Support the transition from pilot initiatives to large-scale deployment** by enabling innovations to move from “lab to fab”, through SME-friendly incentive structures, accelerated permitting processes, and predictable regulatory environments.
- 55. Avoid global spillover effects** by ensuring that growing biomass demand does not lead to ecological degradation or social harm in third countries; uphold strict sustainability criteria and transparency in bioresource supply chains, including under the EU Renewable Energy Directive.

- 56. Recognise and invest in underutilised feedstocks**, such as municipal biowaste, agricultural residues, marine biomass and industrial side-streams, to avoid land-use conflicts and support circular regional economies. Affirming that bioeconomy investments should prioritise the creation of secure jobs in coastal and rural areas, including support for small-scale fisheries and agricultural enterprises.
- 57. Promote regional dialogue** through a structured interparliamentary process in the Baltic Sea Region, aimed at improving coherence, knowledge sharing and common standards in bioeconomy governance.
- 58. Integrate considerations of security and strategic autonomy** into bioeconomy policymaking by promoting bio-based alternatives in critical sectors, such as packaging, chemicals and automotive supply chains, reducing dependence on imported fossil or mineral resources.
- 59. Embed coherence monitoring in parliamentary oversight mechanisms** by developing indicators and tools to assess the balance between food, feed, energy and material use, and ensure that legislative and budgetary decisions are informed by holistic, long-term sustainability considerations.
- 60. Promote aquatic-based bioeconomic innovation** with dedicated research and funding for resource development, i.e. seaweed cultivation, sustainable aquaculture, and blue biotechnology.
- 61. Ensure that future EU bioeconomy frameworks take into account regional ecological sensitivity**, value-chain potential, and stakeholder engagement, particularly in macro-regions such as the Baltic Sea Region.

**Furthermore, the Conference decides to**

- 62. Establish a two-year Working Group on Strengthening Cyber and Information Resilience to Promote Democracy** – based on the decisions of the BSPC Standing Committee - to submit a first report at the 35<sup>th</sup> BSPC and
- 63. Welcome with gratitude the Parliament of Schleswig-Holstein's offer** to host the **35<sup>th</sup> Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference in the Hanseatic City of Lübeck from 30 August to 1 September 2026.**